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Abstract 
In September 1995, a project was initiated to replace the 
existing drive line at NASA’s most unique transonic wind 
tunnel, the National Transonic Facility (NTF), with a single 
101 MW synchronous motor driven by a Load Commutated 
Inverter (LCI).  This Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) system 
also included a custom four-winding transformer, harmonic 
filter, exciter, switchgear, control system, and feeder cable.  
The complete system requirements and design details have 
previously been presented and published [1], as well as the 
commissioning and acceptance test results [2]. The NTF was 
returned to service in December 1997 with the new drive 
system powering the fan. Today, this installation still 
represents the world’s largest horizontal single motor/drive 
combination.  This paper describes some significant events 
that occurred with the drive system during the first 15 years 
of service.  These noteworthy issues are analyzed and root 
causes presented.  Improvements that have substantially 
increased the long term viability of the system are given. 
1.0 Introduction 
NASA's NTF is a closed loop, continuous flow wind tunnel 
that uses a high power ASD system to spin the circulating fan, 
as shown in Figure 1.  This high Reynolds number, cryogenic 
test facility is located at the Langley Research Center in 
Hampton, Virginia, and is widely used by the aircraft industry 
to simulate the full scale, in-flight performance characteristics 
of large transport aircraft at transonic speeds.  NTF is unique 
because it can match cruise flight Mach number and simulate 
the corresponding high altitude Reynolds number. This 
feature is very important to aircraft designers, as it directly 
affects aircraft stability and fuel consumption/passenger mile.  
The NTF is one of two wind tunnels in the world that can 
achieve the high Reynolds number testing capability, and the 
only tunnel that can simulate Reynolds numbers in excess of 
100 million [3]. 
 
Figure 1:  Diagram of the National Transonic Facility. 
 
To reach these conditions, the tunnel uses cryogenic nitrogen 
gas at very low temperature and high density.  With the tunnel 
circuit pressurized to several atmospheres, the power required 
to circulate this low temperature, high pressure gas can reach 
a maximum of 135,000 horsepower.  The original complex, 
aging drive line required significant maintenance and caused 
substantial downtime.  The electromechanical speed control 
system was shared with another transonic tunnel; at times 
limiting the  power for the NTF as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: NTF Mach Number vs. Reynolds Number envelope. 
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2.0 Drive System Overview 
Because the wind tunnel must operate at varying Mach and 
Reynolds numbers, fan speed control is a crucial  
requirement.  Electronic control of high power devices 
driving a synchronous motor is an ideal solution to meet this 
requirement.  Power levels up to 60 MW are typical in 
industry; however, the 101 MW required for the NTF make 
this the largest adjustable speed drive system to date in the 
world and on a comparable scale with global hydro-electric 
pumped storage facilities. The flexibility of a completely 
variable speed drive system coupled to a wind tunnel has 
proven very successful by expanding NASA’s research 
capabilities for the nation.  With improved acceleration, 
deceleration, reliability, speed control and operating envelope 
over the old drive line, the facility has been able to provide 
users a wide variety of test conditions and efficiencies that are 
both cost effective and performance enhancing. 
 
 
Figure 3:  The installed 101 MW NTF Drive Motor. 
 
The ASD system configuration contains a high-voltage, four 
winding, step down isolation transformer feeding a Load 
Commutated Inverter frequency converter with two-channel 
12/12-pulse connections feeding two separate synchronous 
motor stator windings as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4:  Single line diagram of the NTF drive system. 
The LCI converter takes power from the supply network at 
constant voltage and frequency, and converts it to variable 
voltage and frequency feeding the synchronous motor. The 
synchronous machine can be accelerated (motor mode) and 
decelerated (generator mode) at any speed within the 
operating speed range of the NTF fan shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5:  NTF fan requirements;  a) shaft power, b) torque. 
 
The major components of the ASD are: 
1. Synchronous motor 
2. LCI converter (power electronics + control system) 
3. Converter transformer 
4. Harmonic filter 
5. Switchgear 
2.1 Synchronous Motor 
The synchronous motor is a 12-pulse type with two stator 
winding systems. The motor was designed with a 30 
electrical phase-shift between the two stator windings, so that 
pulsating torques are reduced. This provides a relative 
reduction of the mechanical stress on the shaft train and 
minimized flow pulsations. Each motor stator winding uses a 
two layer, Roebel bar winding system in the circumferential 
slots.  The rotor is a forged hub with conical shaft ends 
specially designed for this application. The entire installation 
was accomplished in three separate lifts: lower stator, rotor, 
and finally the upper stator.  The end windings needed 
between the upper and lower halves were field connected and 
the entire machine tested once fully assembled.   The end 
bells were made in two halves, with the upper section easily 
removable for inspections.  The installed motor is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
The cooling of the machine is provided by a water to air heat 
exchanger circulated by blower fans in a closed housing. The 
operation of these fans is controlled depending on the load of 
the motor. The motor bearings are mounted on the same 
foundation frame as the stator frame and are of the tilting pad 
type with pressure oil injection for low speeds.  In order to 
limit the mechanical stress in the existing shaft line, a torque 
limiting device is integrated into the coupling.  Figure 6 
shows general layout of the synchronous motor. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: General layout of the synchronous motor - 1) stator 
winding; 2) rotor shaft ends; 3) NDE bearing; 4) DE bearing; 
5) torque limiting device; 6) turning gear device; 7/8) stator 
covers; 9) motor driven fans; 10) air to water heat exchanger; 
11) foundation frame; 12) slip rings. 
2.2 Load Commutated Inverter 
The power part of the LCI converter consists of two 
independent 6/6-pulse channels, resulting in a total of 4 
identical three-phase bridges. Each bridge has 6 branches 
with 12 series-connected thyristors; each thyristor is rated at 
5200 volts repetitive reverse/direct voltage; one thyristor per 
branch is redundant (‘n+1’ design).  In case of one thyristor 
failure per branch, the ASD is able to run at full load 
continuously.  Both the line-side and the motor-side 
converters can operate as rectifier or inverter, therefore the 
machine can operate as motor (driving mode) or generator 
(braking mode). The thyristors are cooled by an internal 
deionized water circuit supplied from a separate skid. The 
converter efficiency at full load is better than 99%. 
2.3 Converter Transformer 
The LCI matching transformer is a four-winding, oil cooled 
unit designed and manufactured specifically for this 
application.  The unit is an outdoor, mineral oil insulated, 
with forced oil and air cooling.  The transformer takes the 
incoming Center electricity from a pressurized gas 
underground cable and steps it down through two LCI-power 
windings and a tertiary winding for auxiliaries and harmonic 
filtering.  The transformer is rated at 137 MVA with 
115/13.4/13.4/13.8kV voltages respectively. 
2.4  Harmonic Filter 
The harmonic filter was designed to meet the NASA 
requirements for line power factor and harmonic distortion. 
The filter is connected to the tertiary winding of the converter 
transformer with a fundamental power of 50 MVAR split into 
four series-resonant circuits tuned to the 3rd, 5th, 11th and 
13th harmonic frequencies. In all operating conditions the 
power factor is above 0.90 lagging and harmonic distortion is 
below the recommended IEEE 519 [4] Total Harmonic 
Distortion (THD) limits shown in Table 1. The harmonic 
filter consists of four metal enclosed outdoor units, weighing 
over 25,000# each.  The filters are series reactors tuned with 
internally fused capacitors and damping resistors.  The 3/5 
harmonic filters use iron core reactor, as the required design 
impedance and power level for these two filter banks 
precluded using air core reactors in the enclosed filter banks.  
The 11/13 filters use air core reactors.  All units include fan 
cooling.   
 
Shaft Power Speed THD LIMIT  IEEE 519 [4]  
[HP] [RPM] [%] [%]  
    
25000 180 1.4 2.5 
50000 240 1.7 2.5 
86000 300 1.3 2.5 
135000 360 1.1 2.5 
135000 480 1.1 2.5 
135000 600 1.1 2.5 
 
Table 1: Voltage Distortion at the Point of Common Coupling 
2.5 Switchgear 
A metal enclosed, outdoor switchgear line up provides space 
for two line switches, protective relaying, and four system 
breakers.  The relaying and isolator section houses two motor 
operated line switches, each rated at 3000A, 15kv.  Each line 
switch connects a secondary winding of the converter 
transformer to a single 6-pulse LCI inverter bridge.  The 
breaker cubicles consist of  metal clad vacuum breakers for 
main (3000A), harmonic filters (2000A), and field excitation 
transformer (1200A).  Figure 7 shows the relative layout in 
the switchyard of the transformer, harmonic filters, and 
switchgear, respectively from left to right. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Switchyard layout for the NTF drive system. 
3.0 Operational Experience 
The duty cycle of the drive system at the National Transonic 
Facility is not continuous. The nature of closed-circuit wind 
tunnel testing requires constant model adjustments and 
change outs. Therefore, the drive system has to be started and 
stopped many times in a given test program.  This 
requirement was factored into the system specifications – 
“The drive system shall be designed for 20 full load 600 rpm 
drive starts and 20 drive stops in a 24 hour period.” [5].   
When personnel entry into the wind tunnel test section is 
required, the drive system must be completely isolated from 
all electrical power.  This requires opening the stator side line  
isolation switches between the transformer and LCI as well as 
the excitation system and harmonic filter breakers. Historical 
data from the facility logs have shown that the facility has an 
average of 2.3 start/stop cycles per hour of on-line operation 
[6]  Since the system has been installed, the transformer has 
been energized over 100,000 hours, the LCI for  16,200 
hours, and the drive motor for 7,200 hours (fan on hours).  
While these are relatively few operational hours, the breaker 
cycles are in excess of 3000 and the system has withstood 
many start-stop transients. 
 
The following sections outline selected noteworthy events 
that have occurred over the last fifteen years.  The facility 
keeps a well-documented log of issues via Problem/Failure 
Reports (PFR), Task/Test Reports (TTR) and daily logs of 
research notes.  By researching these documents and personal 
experience with several of the major issues, the authors 
present several problems, root causes, and lessons learned. 
 
3.1 Synchronous Motor 
 
3.1.1 Motor Rotor Ground Fault 
 
a. Problem - In April 2005 the drive system experienced the 
first of several trips initiated by the rotor ground fault sensing 
circuit.  When investigated, a ground fault path was not 
present from the rotor and the excitation ground fault relay 
could be reset.  The drive system tripped off several more 
times in April.  Cleaning and tightening maintenance was 
conducted on the slip-ring area up to the end bell, however 
another trip occurred in May.  At that time, the drive was shut 
down until the system provider could be brought in to 
troubleshoot the problem.  Additional runs were made under 
the supervision of the service engineer, and the ground fault 
relay was determined to be operating satisfactorily. The 
rotor/connections was highly suspect as the faults were 
associated with high rpm operation.  The drive end (DE) bell 
was removed and the rotor connections were inspected.  The 
copper bars that fed power to the field poles on the rotor cone 
were unsupported.  Several bolts were missing and supporting 
insulators were damaged along the rotor interconnection bars 
and backing sections between the pole pieces.  Pieces of the 
broken bolts had fallen into the rotor poles and stator end 
windings.  
 
b. Root Cause - The root cause of the failure was determined 
to be thermal and rotational overload stress on the retaining 
bolts and insulators holding the DC interconnection bars to 
the outer surface of the rotor shaft. The original design of the 
motor did not take into account the correct loads for the 
fasteners.  The tolerance of the insulator/retaining bolt fit to 
the copper bar did not allow room for growth, crushing the 
insulator and putting addition stress in the retaining bolts. 
Once the first bolt fatigued, the remaining bolts gave way.   
 
c. Solution - New insulators were manufactured with 
sufficient room for the copper to flex.  The interconnection 
bars were secured with a higher strength bolt.  The damaged 
areas of the rotor and stator were cleaned and reinsulated. 
 
d. Lesson Learned- Design of rotating components must 
include all load conditions and factors including ambient 
conditions and effects or rotating weight.  Know what the 
safety factors are! 
 
3.1.2 Pole Piece Interconnection Delamination 
 
a. Problem - In August 2006 the drive system experienced a 
trip on the rotor ground fault sensing circuit.  The back 
lamination of a short,  unwrapped rotor pole connection began 
to peel away starting at the leading edge of the connection 
until the delamination contacted the rotor surface.  The tear 
was approximately 2/3 of the width of the connection and 
along the interface with the bolted connection, as shown in 
Figure 8.  The motor was operating at 600 rpm at the time of 
the trip.  It did not tear off completely since the motor tripped 
offline as soon as the delaminated section contacted the rotor 
surface.  There was evidence that several other unwrapped 
pole connections had signs of delamination and tears.  The 
delamination is shown in Figure 8. 
 
b.  Root Cause – The short laminated copper connection to 
the pole pieces were not originally taped.  These were initially 
thought to be sufficiently strong without additional wrapping.  
As the connections flexed at high speed, air was forced in 
between the laminations causing vibration that led to fatigue 
concentrated at the fixed ends of the connections.   
 
c. Solution – The system provider recommended to cut off the 
delaminated portion and wrap the damaged portion with glass 
tape, epoxy coat, and cure.  All other connections were glass-
tape wrapped, epoxy coated, and cured for 16 hours.  
 
d.  Lesson Learned – Laminated copper connections exposed 
to high speed cross flow air need to be secured with tape and 
epoxy to prevent vibration fatigue, regardless of length. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Rotor pole piece flexible connection delamination. 
3.2 Load Commutated Inverter 
3.2.1 Link Reactor Eddy Current 
a.  Problem - During a routine inspection of the LCI 
equipment in September 2001, maintenance personnel 
observed burn marks at each of the four DC link reactors.  
The four large air core reactors are water cooled and mounted 
above the thyristor power stacks in the LCI enclosure.  Figure 
9 shows the insulated corner of the reactor base frame heated 
from eddy current flow though the floor grating.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Eddy current damage on reactor frame. 
 
b.  Root Cause - Detailed examination of the burn areas and 
steel connections confirmed that an eddy current flow path 
had been established through the base frame of the reactor 
and the steel grid decking to which it was bolted.  In this 
closed loop, the magnetic flux, caused by the ripple current 
superimposed to the direct current inside the winding, 
induced a voltage that caused high current flow.  While no 
alarms had occurred and the drive system was fully 
functional, the anomaly was corrected as soon as practical.   
 
c. Solution – The system provider and link reactor 
manufacturer were notified of the problem.  The solution was 
to add fiberglass insulators beneath the reactor frames 
elevating  the units off the steel grid approximately one inch, 
breaking the eddy current circuit path.  This raised  the 
relative height of the cooling water connections.  To 
accommodate this new complication, the cooling water 
system was drained and flanged pipe spacers to match the 
new height to the existing cooling water piping were installed.  
Once the modifications were completed, there were no further 
issues with eddy current damage. 
 
d.  Lesson Learned – While the reactors were properly 
designed with open magnetic circuit bases, this was thwarted 
by mounting the frames directly to the steel decking.  
Installation details must be included in the design phase to 
assure that equipment works as intended once installed.  
Construction inspection provides the owner quality assurance 
that the design is being correctly implemented. 
 
3.2.2  Control Voltage Power Supply 
 
a.  Problem - In February 1999, the 24 vdc power supply for 
the thyristor firing and monitoring racks failed.  This power 
supply included a  voltage sensitive relay, such that  thyristors 
firing is inhibited if the power supply output voltage falls 
below 20 volts.  This feature ‘protects’ the thyristors from 
incorrectly firing when control voltage is lost.  The ASD shut 
down in an orderly manner when this power supply failed.  
Without a spare, a generic power supply without this relay 
protection was temporarily installed in order to continue 
research testing.  After several days of operation, this power 
supply also failed and a violent shutdown of the ASD 
occurred. 
 
b. Root Cause - Without the power supply sensing protection 
circuit, the LCI control software did not know the power 
supply had failed.  The control system could not close the 
firing window to the conducting thyristors and two phases per 
bridge were left turned on.  This condition caused a phase to 
phase short circuit overcurrent and consequently tripped the 
main circuit breaker.  The high overcurrent flow shorted 16 
thyristors, causing a severe shock throughout the motor and 
foundation. 
c. Solution - The system supplier shipped a new power supply 
to replace the defective one, and a spare unit, to preclude a 
future failure from causing downtime or system damage.  In 
addition, 16 thyristors were shipped to replace the defective 
ones. After a thorough inspection, no other system or 
structural damage was found.  The technicians were trained 
with regard to the criticality of the power supply interlocks 
within the LCI.   
d. Lesson Learned – Replacement parts must be suitable for 
the application requirements.  Temporary fixes have risks that 
should be evaluated by probability and consequences.  All 
parties should understand and accept the risks prior to 
operation.  Spare part inventories should include low cost, 
critical components. This event could have been a 
catastrophic failure for the drive and motor foundation.  
3.2.3 Heat Exchanger  
a.  Problem - The LCI was designed with a separate closed 
loop cooling skid to remove the heat generated by the losses 
in the converter stacks.  The primary de-ionized cooling water 
loop uses a water to water heat exchanger (HEX) to reject the 
thyristor heat losses into the facility’s centralized cooling 
water system.  With an overall converter efficiency of 99%, 
the losses are relatively small, but at 101MW operation, this 
equates to 1 megawatt of heat to be removed.  Over time, the 
pressure drop across the heat exchanger gradually rose, until  
in 2006, sufficient cooling was not achievable.   
b.  Root Cause - The excessive pressure drop across the HEX  
was a result of gradual clogging in the circulating paths from 
foreign material entrained by the open-air cooling tower.  The 
tower is constantly entraining dust from an adjacent busy 
highway and pollen from the local flora.     
c. Solution - The existing cooling water system has a 50 MW 
capacity, and is used for all facility cooling needs.  A sand 
filter system for this large cooling tower would be cost 
prohibitive.  The other cooling circuits at the facility are not 
as sensitive to the material build-up as the small LCI heat 
exchanger.  In lieu of providing a smaller filtering system, the 
decision was made to keep a spare HEX and monitor the 
pressure drop on the LCI cooling system. 
d.  Lesson Learned – Existing utilities are often assumed to be 
available for retrofit or new installation upgrades during the 
conceptual and design phases of a project.  Operational 
characteristics of these existing subsystems must be fully 
understood to assure successful support of new capabilities.  
Responsibility for determining these can be specified to the 
system provider. 
 
3.2.4 ‘Low Voltage’ Undervoltage 
 
a.  Problem - As the drive system was beginning regular 
operations in early 1998, an intermittent condition arose 
where seemingly random  low voltage alarm and trips would 
occur on the LCI.  The anomaly started by triggering the low 
voltage alarm on the 480 vac motor control center, MCC3, 
voltage monitoring relay.  Since the LCI control power was 
fed from MCC3, subsequently an alarm and trip of the LCI on 
“Low Voltage Undervoltage” would occur. The event would 
only happen with the tunnel in cryogenic mode (using liquid 
nitrogen) and the drive system on line.  From the facility data-
logger, further correlation was made between energizing one 
particular liquid nitrogen pump and the trip event.  
 
b. Root Cause – The liquid nitrogen pump in question, “P1”, 
was driven by a 100 Hp induction motor which starts across 
the line with no inrush current limiting features.  The pump 
and MCC3 were fed from the same upstream transformer.  A 
recording was made of the MCC3 bus voltage during a P1 
pump start as shown in Figure 10. The voltage dropped 8% 
for 5 seconds, sufficiently low enough and long enough to 
trigger a low voltage trip on the LCI.  This test was made 
independently of any other loads on the bus, so the actual dip 
was probably lower. 
 
c.  Solution – The parameters in the LCI control were changed 
to increase the allowable voltage dip and time duration. No 
further incidents occurred with undervoltage conditions on 
the LCI.  A higher tap setting was connected on the secondary 
side of the step down control voltage transformer internal to 
the LCI minimizing the sensitivity to undervoltage conditions. 
 
d. Lesson Learned – If existing utilities will be used to 
provide support for new installations or upgrades, full 
characterization, including transient conditions have to be 
understood. 
 
Figure 10:  480 vac voltage dip at MCC3 when starting P1. 
 
3.2.5 Field Excitation Cooling Anomaly 
a. Problem – In early 1999, intermittent trips were occurring 
on the Field Excitation control system immediately after the 
drive was commanded on. Sequence data indicated that the 
processor chassis cooling fans were not operational, however, 
by observation they were running.  The cooling fan air flow 
switches were bypassed confirming that the dampers were not 
maintaining an ‘open’ position once the fans were energized. 
b. Root Cause – There was insufficient air flow to maintain 
the open position of the dampers until sufficient air flow was 
established through the entire chassis.  Without the dampers 
holding in the flow position, the flow indicating switches 
were not satisfied.  
c. Solution – Increase the delay timer on loss of cooling flow 
trip condition. 
d. Lesson Learned – Time delays have to be appropriately set 
for realist operation, not based on theoretical performance.  
Too much sensitivity generates false alarms and nuisance 
trips. 
3.3 Converter Transformer  
There have been no problems with the transformer operation.  
3.4 Harmonic Filter 
3.4.1 Reactor Failure – Manufacturing Defect 
a. Problem - In early 1998 the drive system experienced two 
separate failures in the harmonic filter. The first failure 
involved a melt-down of the phase C reactor on the 3rd 
harmonic filter.  There were no spares on hand.  Because the 
facility was involved in a critical research test, the system 
provider was contacted regarding operational limits without 
the third harmonic filter so that testing could continue.  This 
resulted in a set of operational curves defining all filter bank 
combinations and corresponding maximum load conditions. 
The load cases were constrained by overload of the remaining 
connected filter components, overload of the power provider's 
upstream capacitor bank, and limitation of the voltage 
distortion at PCC to 3% [7].  Figure 11 shows the reduction in 
power for the case without the third harmonic filter.  The 
drive was reconfigured to operate without the filter, and 
fortunately, the test conditions were within the operating 
envelope allowed by the system provider. Once the 
replacement reactor was fabricated and installed, system 
operation returned to normal.   
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Figure 11:  Reduced load envelope without the 3rd harmonic 
filter energized. 
 
The second failure, three months later, involved a similar 
failure of the phase A reactor on the 5th harmonic filter.  
Again the system was reconfigured with the failed harmonic 
filter taken out of operation because there were no spares 
available.  However, the power level permitted for operation 
was so low that all research test conditions could not be met.   
 
b. Root Cause - After the second filter failure, a great deal of 
attention was placed on the reactor vendor to explain the root 
cause of the failure.  All six iron core reactors were 
manufactured by the same vendor.  At first the vendor could 
not identify any defect that would relate to the failure of the 
units.  After further investigation, the vendor finally 
determined the root cause of the problem.  The  reactor’s 
center core installation process had recently started using a 
new type of epoxy that was not fully cured during 
manufacturing.  This epoxy would reflow at high operating 
temperatures, allowing the core to shift, changing the 
inductance of the reactor.  As the inductance changed, more 
current flowed, inducing a thermal runaway in the reactor.   
 
c. Solution - The vendor changed the epoxy materials, 
installed different pumping and mixing equipment, and 
improved gapping in the center core to allow free flow of 
epoxy fully surrounding the steel shunts.  The vendor also 
agreed to provide a complete set of six new reactors and in 
August 1998, the system provider completed the installation 
under warranty.  The change out actually proved to be very 
challenging, because the overhead bus duct and damping 
resistors prevented easy access to the reactor locations, as 
shown in Figure 7.   
 
d.  Lesson Learned – Perseverance is required to get to the 
root cause of some problems.  Had the vendor not taken the 
effort and time to carefully examine the manufacturing 
process and determined the failure mode, additional reactors 
would have eventually failed one by one.   
 
Always consider the maintenance and repair access when 
installing heavy or complex equipment in congested areas.  
Highly integrated efficient use of real estate can be attractive 
until something has to be extracted from the internal areas. 
Crane availability and location are also important to consider. 
3.4.2 Reactor Failure – Transient Flashover 
a. Problem - In August 2003, the drive system tripped offline 
again due to 3/5 harmonic filter overcurrent.  During 
investigation of the filter bank, it was noted that the phase B 
reactor on the 3rd harmonic filter had failed.  Figure 12 shows 
the damage to the harmonic filter reactor. 
 
  b. Root Cause – Transient overvoltage had bridged through 
the reactor to ground, establishing an arc that destroyed the 
lead connection and part of the reactor winding.  The transient 
was attributed to the frequent starting and stopping and the 
arc-over event to insufficient insulation voltage.  
 
c. Solution - Although the root cause was traced to a transient 
condition from frequent starting and stopping, the decision 
was made to change reactor vendors.  A new unit was 
installed in October 2003. Glastic barriers were added on each 
reactor between the winding and outer legs to increase the 
installed insulation voltage rating.   
 
 
 
Figure 12: Failed Harmonic Filter Reactor. 
 
d. Lesson Learned – Insulation voltage rating of components 
can be compromised during installation and use.  
Conservatism in design and installation is valuable for a long 
term system installation. 
3.5 Switchgear 
3.5.1 Failure of the LCI Line Isolation Switches 
a. Problem - To isolate the stator side of the synchronous 
motor from electrical power, two motor operated line 
switches were installed in the switchgear line-up between the 
transformer secondaries and the input to the LCI line side 
inverter.  These switches were a cost effective solution to 
breakers (especially since the interrupting capacity was not 
needed) and were believed to be correctly suited for the 
application.  In December 1998, LCI 89-B line switch failed 
as the drive system was being isolated. The NTF was 
operating at a low fan load condition, approximately 0.8 MW, 
60 rpm, prior to the failure.  Personnel in an adjacent building 
indicated a large explosion had occurred in the switchyard.  
The LCI 89-B cubicle door had blown off, and the inner metal 
shield panels had been blown off the right side, consequently 
scraping into several terminal blocks, shorting them. Metal 
splatter and arcing  throughout the cubicle indicate a phase to 
phase arc and  phase to ground arc had been established.  The 
rear insulating standoffs had been plated with metal plasma 
when the fault occurred, rendering the insulators useless. 
Figure 13 shows the damaged switch prior to removal. The 
decision was made not to replace the insulators, but instead to 
provide solid copper buswork in place of the switch 
mechanism as a temporary connection.  This would allow 
research testing to continue while the switches were replaced.  
Temporary modifications to the control code and the facility 
operating procedures were required to control isolation of the 
drive by the main 115 kV circuit breaker upstream of the 
transformer.  The old switch mechanism was removed and the 
undamaged switch, LCI 89-A, was left in the closed position. 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Damaged LCI 89-B line isolator switch 
 
b. Root Cause - Root cause of the fault was determined to be 
opening the switch with residual capacitive current flowing 
across the switch contacts.  This current flow was a result of 
the thyristor snubber circuits and leakage currents of the 
shielded primary feeder cables.  The LCI snubber circuit 
resistor/capacitor networks require 1.5 amps reactive current.  
The 600’ of (4) parallel 1000 kcmil cable runs require another 
1.5 amps capacitive leakage current.  The switches were 
designed for zero current opening and cannot open with 
current flow for two reasons: 1)  No arc chutes/blades are 
provided to protect the main contacts and extinguish the arc, 
2) The switches physically do not open fast enough to prevent 
a re-strike arc from forming.  Consequently, an opening of 
capacitive current can initiate a re-strike phenomenon, 
ratcheting up the arc voltage indefinitely, causing an ionizing 
environment within the switch area.  This ionized air will then 
conduct phase to phase or phase to ground current anywhere a 
path is available.  It was also determined that the switches 
were designed for 250 cycles, and had already exceeded the 
design life cycle count.   These were not designed to handle 
the higher cycle count required by the wind tunnel 
application. 
  
c. Solution - The line switches were redesigned and replaced.  
The new switches included arc chutes, stronger release 
springs, and mechanical hardware designed for the frequent 
cycling application.  As part of the quality assurance plan, a 
prototype switch was built, tested to failure, with results 
incorporated into the production units.  Unfortunately, when 
the switches arrived at the site to be installed, both line 
switches had very poor insulation readings.  The problem was 
isolated to the switches’ fibreglass pushrods, which, from 
appearance were  perfect.  A new set of pushrods were 
installed and the switches have operated successfully since. 
 
d. Lesson Learned – To meet overall system level 
requirements, traceability to the sub supplier is required.  In 
addition, communication of absolutes, not relatives is 
important.  Zero is sometimes just close to zero.  Finally, 
everything must pass quality assurance inspections, even 
brand new replacement hardware. 
 
3.5.2  Breaker Wear out 
 
a. Problem – By 2008, the frequency of breaker operation 
was taking a significant toll on the reliability of the harmonic 
filter and excitation breakers in the switchyard.  Several 
operational failures and an insulator flashover drove the 
decision to replace the breakers. 
 
b. Root Cause – The breakers were worn out from excessive 
cycling needed by the wind tunnel application. 
 
c. Solution – New breakers were purchased and installed, the 
existing breakers were refurbished and kept for spares. 
 
d. Lesson Learned – Reliability can be maintained either 
through robustness or a well-organized replacement schedule.  
In this case, it was accepted that the breakers would be used 
as switching devices; and when reliability reached the 
threshold of unacceptability, the units were replaced. 
4.0 Project-Level Lessons 
Each event listed in this paper can be analyzed and specific 
root causes determined.  One can understand, after the failure, 
what went wrong and see clear ways to make detail-level 
improvements to preclude the events from occurring again.  
None of these events were complex technically, but rendered 
the system non-operational just the same.  Beyond the 
individual actions, there are higher level observations that 
should be noted as important lessons to apply for every 
project whether routine or unique. 
 
4.1  Requirements 
 
The Owner’s requirement documents must include all 
necessary performance points and limiting constraints that the 
system is expected to operate within. All conditions, 
operating modes, influences of subsystems, and owner 
preferences must be clearly explained.  Each requirement 
must include a measurable acceptance criteria.  For desirable 
performance that is difficult to measure ie - design life, mean 
time between failure, or cycle rates, innovated ways and drill 
down into quality control are needed to assure the owner that 
the requirements are being met.  Be prepared to invest in this 
quality assurance action to achieve the desired performance. 
 
4.2  Application 
 
Application specific information defining exactly where and 
how the system will be used must be given to the system 
provider.  Local ambient conditions, cooling tower design 
data, power grid harmonic baselines and regulation capability, 
and load particulars are some of the necessary parameters. 
Even if determination or measurement of in-situ values are 
difficult to obtain accurately, it must be done.  There is no 
way a system provider can design and provide a successful 
solution to an undefined application. 
 
4.3  System Provider 
 
Selection of a system provider is critical in the success of any 
project, but for first time, one of a kind projects, competence 
and attitude can be deal breaker.  The working relationship 
between the owner and system provider in this case was 
excellent, and it was clear that both parties were working to 
achieve the same goals in this project.  During the problems 
that occurred, even after the warranty period, the relationship 
between owner and system provided remained positive and 
professional, making the difficult times less of a hardship.   
 
4.4  Installation 
 
Many times the installation design gets a lower priority than 
system performance design.  Many reasons (excuses) are 
given for not developing detailed conduit runs, piping layouts, 
and equipment foundation details.  For the owner, these can 
jeopardize the overall project success as easily as a poorly 
designed component.  Specifications for installation designs 
have to be included in the requirement documents early in the 
solicitation phase to emphasis the importance of this project 
element.  Inspections and quality assurance are equally 
important in the installation/construction phase to assure that 
the system is installed as designed. 
 
4.5  Spare Parts 
 
Allocations for spare parts can be difficult; unless funds can 
be justified on downtime cost.  For a new and unique system, 
some components should have a ‘burn-in’ period to prove the 
performance prior to purchasing spares.  Had spares of the 
original iron core reactors been procured, they would have 
been defective as well.  For the  more common, proven 
components such as the LCI low voltage supply, a correct 
spare would have been very prudent.  A good approach would 
be to get low risk spares early on; as well as components that 
are part of a manufacturing lot.  
 
4.6  Temporary Solutions 
 
While production is always the  priority, temporary solutions 
must be carefully thought through and associated risks 
understood.  In the case of the harmonic filter failures, limited 
operation was a successful work around until the repair was 
made.  For the LCI power supply replacement, it represented 
a risk that was unacceptable; and the probability that the 
second power supply would fail so soon was too high.  Never 
forget that a temporary solution increases the probability of a 
double order failure mode. 
 
4.7  Warranty 
 
The NTF drive system was provided with a three year 
warranty.  This extended period was extremely valuable for a 
unique, custom designed system of this magnitude.  Because 
the drive system had so much intermittent operation, several 
years were required for the ‘infant mortality’ type initial 
failures to occur.  The value of this warranty could not have 
been estimated in the initial project phases.  Always consider 
the warrant period and get the longest one possible. 
 
Summary  
 
Operation of the world’s largest adjustable speed drive in a 
NASA wind tunnel has been exciting and fulfilling.  The 
capability of the ASD far exceeded the original drive train, 
and provides capabilities that were not foreseen at the onset of 
the project.   
 
Many of the problems experienced with the drive system have 
not been from the technology chosen or materials selected, 
but with the application challenges of fitting the system into a 
wind tunnel testing environment.  For engineers today, this 
same challenge remains.  Technology changes, but for each 
application, good planning and design thoughtfulness is a 
constant requirement.  Success of a complex system is only as 
good as the weakest component, and one must be always 
vigilant of operational scenarios that indicate a weakness; 
visualizing how things will work together and what the 
impacts are when they don’t.  
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